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Comment
The Constitutionality of Large Scale Police
Tactics: Implications for the Right of
Intrastate Travel
I. Introduction
Feeling thirsty on a hot summer night, you head out to the
corner store for a soda.1 On your way home you see an old
friend on the street. You stop and shake hands. The police
move in. The officers lay you out on the pavement and search
you as the neighbors watch. A helicopter clatters overhead
shining a spotlight on the ground below. Hundreds of police of-
ficers cruise the neighborhood in cars and on foot. Finding
nothing on you, the cops send you on your way with a warning
against hanging out in an area where gangs frequently sell
drugs. The problem is, gangs frequently sell drugs on just
about every corner in your neighborhood.
Throughout the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, fed-
eral, state, and local law enforcement agencies have focused
their energies on a triumvirate of evils that have coalesced in
the inner cities of America - drugs, guns, and gangs.2 The vola-
tile combination has sparked huge jumps in crime rates, partic-
1. This is a fictional account based on numerous newspaper reports and edito-
rial articles in the Los Angeles Times. See Paul Feldman, Police Use a Wide
Broom; LAPD's War on Gangs and Drugs Has Shifted Emphasis, L.A. TIMES, May
8, 1988, § 2, at 1; John Johnson, Night of the Hammer: Retaking the Streets of
South LA, L.A. Tms, July 3, 1989, § 2, at 1; Samuel H. Pillsbury, Gang Sweeps
Only Look Good; Low-Profile, Constant Street Policing is the Better Idea, L.A.
TImEs, Apr. 7, 1988, § 5, at 5; Gary Williams, What of the Innocent Snagged in
'Sweeps'?; The Price of Freedom from Gangs Shouldn't Be All Freedoms, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1988, § 5, at 5.
2. See, e.g., Santiago O'Donnell & Linda Wheeler, D.C. Schools Add Police;
Chief Shifts Officers From Special Units, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1994, § 1, at Al.
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ularly violent crimes such as homicide and robbery.3 From the
President down to local police chiefs, many authorities have
taken the hard line, quickly proclaiming a "war" on drugs.4
Traditional police patrol, however, is ill-suited to fighting a war,
so the police have been forced to adopt new, more aggressive
tactics.
The sweep5 is a police tactic developed to a form of art by
the Los Angeles Police Department (hereinafter "LAPD") under
its former chief Daryl Gates.6 The LAPD began to use sweeps
in the mid-1980s to control gang activity and associated vio-
lence. 7 Paramilitary in nature, by 1988 the LAPD's gang
sweeps often involved hundreds of police officers, helicopters,
and mobile detention centers mobilizing on a target commu-
nity.8 Sweeps generally occur on weekend nights, when both
general social activity and gang activity are at their peak.9
The sweeps are "not an effort to take a lot of drugs off the
street," but rather to "take people off the street."10 Police opera-
tions of a certain magnitude undoubtedly achieve that goal.
Thus, sweeps act as a de facto curfew, preventing many resi-
dents from leaving their homes during the hours of the opera-
tion. Because they operate as a curfew, sweeps implicate the
3. Overall, the nation's murder rate jumped eight percent between 1989 and
1990, and the 1990 murder rate was up nine percent from 1986 levels while the
robbery rate jumped fourteen percent during the same period. U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, 1990 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 9, 20 (1991).
4. But see Gabriel G. Marquez, The Useless War, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1994,
§ 4, at 15.
5. As used in this Comment, a "sweep" refers to a highly focused, large-scale
police mobilization intended to control street crime by arresting large numbers of
people in a short period of time.
6. George Stein, LAPD Nails 352 in Operation Hammer, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1989, § 2, at 1. Gates served as Chief for approximately thirteen years. He re-
signed in the aftermath of the Rodney King verdict and related riots in 1992. See
Robert Reinhold, Head of Police in Philadelphia Chosen for Chief in Los Angeles,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1992, at 1.
7. See Dennis Anderson, Police Mount War on Street Drug Traffic, UPI, Nov.
4, 1984, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
8. Feldman, supra note 1, at 1; Johnson, supra note 1, at 1; Bob Pool, Police
Call Gang Sweep a Success; 1,453 Are Arrested, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1988, § 2, at 1;
see also MIxE DAVIS, CITY OF QuARTz: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN Los ANGELES
267-322 (1990).
9. See Stein, supra note 6, at 1.
10. Anderson, supra note 7.
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constitutional rights of assembly and association," and the
right of locomotion or intrastate travel.12
This Comment will examine the constitutional threats
posed by police sweeps, and possible protections against such
threats. Part II of this Comment will describe basic police strat-
egies and the development of the sweep in Los Angeles. Part III
will consider the impact of the sweep on rights protected by the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Part IV will evalu-
ate possible remedies for those whose rights have been de-
graded. Part V will conclude that the use of very large sweeps
potentially infringes on the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of local residents, and should be subject to a
legal showing of necessity.
II. The Rise of the Sweep Tactic
The police tactic known as a "sweep" is an extension of
traditional police strategies and tactics. Police departments in
the United States have progressed through several strategical
phases in this century, and many are currently struggling with
proposals for basic changes in strategy. This section will dis-
cuss the history of police strategy in the United States and in
Los Angeles, including the development of the sweep tactic.
A. Development of Police Strategy in the United States
The modern notion of an organized police force was first im-
plemented in London, England in 1829.13 Sir Robert Peel de-
vised a policing strategy based on foot patrols by officers
walking a specific beat. 14 The beats were devised so that the
constable covered his entire beat every ten to fifteen minutes,
and thus could easily be located by a citizen who needed assist-
ance.' 5 Walking a beat also allowed the officer to become ac-
quainted with local residents and to keep informed about
11. See infra notes 78-111 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 149-91 and accompanying text. Recently the court in Qutb
v. Strauss, 8 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 1993) considered how a juvenile curfew implicated
these rights under strict scrutiny review.
13. George L. Kelling & David Fogel, Police Patrol - Some Future Directions,
in THE FuTURE OF POLICING 153 (Alvin W. Cohn ed., 1978).
14. Id. at 153-54.
15. Id. at 153.
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activities in the community. 16 The first organized police force in
the United States was established in Boston in 1838.17 Early
American police forces were adapted from the British model,
and generally followed the beat cop strategy.18
Modem police strategy has its roots in the work of the in-
fluential law enforcement analyst O.W. Wilson. 19 Wilson's the-
ory of "preventive patrol"20 was grounded on the belief that
effective policing requires police departments to create a sense
of omnipresence in the community through high visibility pa-
trols and rapid response to emergency calls. 2 ' Wilson also rec-
ognized the need to maintain day-to-day interaction between
officers and the community. 22 Yet as police departments shifted
from foot patrol to automobile patrol in an effort to economically
create the impression of omnipresence, the ability of individual
officers to maintain that essential communication with the com-
munity declined.23
In an effort to increase efficiency, law enforcement theo-
rists increasingly promoted the use of complex, mathematically
derived automobile patrol routes designed to maximize the
sense of omnipresence in the community and minimize response
time.24 The result was a reactive police strategy, in which police
officers patrolled large areas and only left their vehicle to re-
spond to calls. 25 Some theorists even considered community in-
teraction a corrupting influence that interfered with their
conception of a detached, professional police force.26
16. Id. at 154.
17. Edward Eldefonso et al., PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 219 (2d ed.
1974).
18. EDWARD A. THIBAULT ET AL., PROACTIVE POLICE MANAGEMENT 14 (3d ed.
1990).
19. O.W. WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION (1963).
20. According to Wilson, the basic purpose of the police patrol is to prevent
crime by eliminating the opportunity or the belief in the opportunity for successful
criminal activity. Id. at 228.
21. Id. at 228, 244-45.
22. Id. at 228.
23. See PAuL B. WESTON, POLICE ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 140 (1976).
24. See, e.g., J.F. ELLIOT, INTERCEPTION PATROL (1973); Roy C. LARSON, URBAN
POLICE PATROL ANALYSIS (1972).
25. Kelling & Fogel, supra note 13, at 158.
26. See, e.g., James D. Bannon, Foot Patrol: The Litany of Law Enforcement,
THE POLICE CHIEF, Apr. 1972, at 44-45.
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In the 1970s, scholars began to question the effectiveness of
the preventive patrol strategy and promoted a variety of re-
forms.27 Specific factors identified as contributing to the failure
of preventive patrol included increasing community alienation,
failure to understand the nature of violent crime, and misun-
derstandings about victim response to crime. 28 Some critics of
traditional police strategy believed that the reestablishment of
extensive ties to the community by altering patrol tactics and
emphasizing interaction with local citizens was critical to creat-
ing a more effective police force.29
Despite these criticisms, most municipalities faced with ris-
ing crime and shrinking budgets continued to rely on preventive
patrol strategies. 30 Although police departments around the
country tinkered with various reforms,31 it was not until the
late 1980s that a few major cities, faced with mounting drug
problems and skyrocketing murder rates, undertook major stra-
tegic reforms, generally referred to as "community policing."32
The concept of community policing takes many forms, but the
emphasis is on addressing the problems identified by critics of
preventive patrol, particularly the problem of community alien-
ation.33 This is generally done by reestablishing ties to the com-
27. See, e.g., LARSON, supra note 24; GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS
CITY PREvENTIvE PATROL EXPERIMENT (1974); J.F. Schnelle et al., Social Evalua-
tion Research: The Evaluation of Two Police Patrolling Strategies, 4 J. APPLIED
BEHAV. ANALYsis 353 (1975).
28. Kelling & Fogel, supra note 13, at 167-70.
29. See id.; Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Ap-
proach, 25 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 236 (1979); James Q. Wilson & George L. Kel-
ling, Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, at 29.
30. Even today, most municipalities operate under the basic preventive patrol
strategy and organization popularized by O.W. Wilson. THiBAULT, supra note 18,
at 3.
31. See id. at 206-23.
32. Houston was one of the first major cities to implement community policing
in the late 1980s under Police Commissioner Lee Brown. Some smaller cities such
as Flint, Michigan and Aurora, Colorado moved to a community policing strategy
in the early 1980s. Robert C. Trojanowicz, An Evaluation of a Neighborhood Foot
Patrol Program, 11 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 410, 410 (1983); Gary Enos, Cities
Take Diverse Paths to Community Policing; Ultimate Goal is to Reduce Crime, CITY
& ST., July 27, 1992, at 16.
33. See Enos, supra note 32.
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munity, often by returning to the old-fashioned beat cop
patrolling a familiar neighborhood on foot.3 4
B. The Los Angeles Police Department
This is the continuing saga of us versus them and we've got a
bigger gang than they do.
Lt. Dan Cooke, LAPD (1984).35
The LAPD can be considered the prototype of a traditional,
automobile-based, aggressive, preventive patrol police force.36
Charged with patrolling a vast area that is home to millions of
people, the LAPD faces problems typical of major American cit-
ies: widespread drug trafficking, poverty, and a high rate of vio-
lent crime.37 Faced with spiraling crime rates, and a surge in
street gangs and gang-related crime in the late 1980s, the peo-
ple of Los Angeles demanded action. The LAPD responded with
aggressive traditional tactics rather than progressive commu-
nity policing tactics.38
Despite several attempts to incorporate more modern police
strategies, the LAPD's policing strategy is relatively unchanged
from the days of the old television show "Dragnet."3 9 The basic
patrol function is performed by uniformed officers cruising the
streets in marked patrol cars.40 Patrolling large areas, officers
leave their units only to respond to calls or investigate activity
on the street.41 As with all automobile-based preventive patrol
strategies, a premium is placed on keeping all units "in-ser-
34. See Ken Peak et al., Improving Citizen Perceptions of the Police: "Back to
the Basics" with a Community Policing Strategy, 20 J. Cram. JusT. 25, 26-28(1992).
35. Anderson, supra note 7.
36. "The LAPD has a reputation as a hard working, car-based mobile strike
force that is tough on criminals." INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 23 (1991) [herein-
after CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT].
37. Id. at 22; Los ANGELES POLICE DEP'T, 1990 STATISTICAL DIGEST 1.2 (1991)
[hereinafter STATISTicAL DIGEST]. The LAPD patrols an area of approximately 470
square miles, with a total population of 3.3 million people. Id.
38. Between 1988 and 1990, the number of homicides surged twenty-five per-
cent and the number of robberies jumped twenty-eight percent in the area served
by the LAPD. STATISTICAL DIGEST, supra note 37, at 2.3, 2.7.
39. See CHRSTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 101-04.
40. Kelling & Fogel, supra note 13, at 157.
41. Id.
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vice." 42 A unit is considered in-service when the officers are in
the car, cruising the patrol route.43 Thus, the emphasis on
keeping units in-service has the practical effect of minimizing
the officers' contact with community residents. 44
The LAPD has historically been known for aggressively im-
plementing this basic strategy. 45 Intimidation and omnipres-
ence have been the trademark of the LAPD under successive
police chiefs, particularly Chief Daryl Gates, who held the post
for thirteen years until he resigned under pressure following
major riots in 1991.46 Gates set the tone for the police force, and
his controversial, outspoken style further eroded the LAPD's re-
lationship with many communities. 47 Gates' views on the use of
force were made clear to every officer in the LAPD when he told
a United States Senate committee that casual drug users
should be taken out and shot." In addition, he has repeatedly
antagonized minority communities with racist remarks. 49
Between 1960 and 1990, the overall crime rate in Los Ange-
les increased more than three hundred percent.50 The LAPD
periodically responded with new programs designed to promote
community involvement.51 Following the Watts riots in 1965,52
the LAPD assigned Community Relations Officers to each
neighborhood to promote communication with residents. 53 In
the 1970s, the LAPD adopted a "team-policing" strategy, again
42. Id. at 158.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 99.
46. Joseph D. McNamara, Police Story; Report Just Underlined the Obvious:
Gates has Long Acted Questionably, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1991, at Ml; Reinhold,
supra note 6, at 1.
47. McNamara, supra note 46.
48. Harold Meyerson, Gatesgate: L.A. Liberals Meet the Police Chief, NEW RE-
PUBLIC, June 10, 1991, at 20.
49. Id. "During his thirteen years as Chief, he has called Blacks physiologi-
cally different from 'normal people,' Latinos 'lazy,' and Salvadorans 'drunks.'" Id.
50. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 23.
51. Id. at 101.
52. In August, 1965, the community of Watts in South-Central Los Angeles
broke out into riots after a white police officer arrested a young African-American
male. THE POLITICS OF RIOT COMMISSIONS 1917-1970, at 261 (Anthony Platt ed.,
1971). The riots lasted for six days and resulted in 34 deaths and extensive prop-
erty damage. Id. at 261-64.
53. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 101.
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designed to promote greater contact with local residents. 54 All
of these programs, however, were created to supplement the ba-
sic preventive patrol strategy of the LAPD rather than to funda-
mentally alter the Department's overall strategy, and in 1979
the LAPD began to eliminate them due to budget constraints. 55
The 1980s posed a major challenge to the LAPD's tradi-
tional strategy. Faced with a growing drug problem, Chief
Gates initially responded with a program known as DARE -
Drug Abuse Resistance Education - in 1983.56 Although DARE
is a community-oriented program, like earlier efforts it has
merely been a supplement to the traditional style of law en-
forcement that is the backbone of the LAPD's operations.
57
Starting in the mid-1980s, gang activity and gang-related crime
in Los Angeles skyrocketed. 58 Given Gates's belief in hard-
nosed aggressive policing, it is not surprising that his principal
response to increasing crime rates was traditional - enhance the
sense of police omnipresence and try to intimidate potential
criminals until they learn that criminal behavior is more of a
hassle than it is worth.
To achieve this goal, the LAPD began to use sweeps. 59
Starting in 1984, the gang sweeps targeted communities
plagued by gang-related violence.60 According to Chief Gates,
the sweeps were "not an effort to take a lot of drugs off the
street," but rather to "take people off the street."6' Gates pre-
dicted that the strategy would have a calming effect on gang
rivalries that were the source of much violence. 62
Gates' prediction failed to come true, and in the late 1980s
Los Angeles saw double digit increases in the rates of many vio-
lent crimes including homicide and robbery.63 The LAPD again
54. Id.
55. Id. at 102.
56. Gates consistently focused on the problem of narcotics, characterizing it as
the "greatest common danger threatening the safety of the people of Los Angeles"
as early as 1983. Los ANGELES POLICE DEP'T, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1984).
57. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 103-04.
58. See Los ANGELES POLICE DEP'T, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT (1989).
59. Anderson, supra note 7.
60. See id.; Los ANGELES POLICE DEP'T., supra note 58, at 8.
61. See Anderson, supra note 7.
62. Id.
63. Davan Maharaj, Crime Rise Triggers a New Sweep on Gangs, L.A. TIMES,
July 9, 1989, § 2, at 1.
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responded with a show-of-force strategy intended to intimidate
criminals by virtually constant harassment. "Operation Ham-
mer" was unveiled in early 1988, and it institutionalized the
massive sweeps begun in 1984.64 Under Operation Hammer,
task forces of hundreds of police officers conducted highly publi-
cized forays into communities affected by gang violence. 65 Dur-
ing a sweep, officers detained or arrested suspected gang
members on any charges they could, including everything from
felonies to traffic citations. 66 The massive sweeps were supple-
mented by a 160-officer anti-gang unit that targeted particular
communities for nightly sweeps.67
In addition to sweeps, another major tactic in support of the
LAPD's strategy of aggressive policing is the use of extensive
field investigations. 68 Field investigations involve the stop and
search of large numbers of people who fit a "gang profile," often
based on race, age, and style of dress.6 9 During a single week in
1988, the anti-gang unit formally stopped and questioned over
2,400 people, filling out index cards with name, address, and
gang affiliation if any.70 All of these tactics are meant to intimi-
date potential criminals off the street and reassure the public
that the LAPD is out on the street protecting the community. 71
III. Rights Implicated by the Sweep
I think people believe that the only strategy we have is to put a lot
of police officers on the street and harass people and make arrests
for inconsequential kinds of things. That's part of the strategy, no
question about it.
Daryl F. Gates
Former Chief of the LAPD 72
The sweep raises constitutional concerns because it pre-
vents people from leaving their homes for any reason, creating
64. Los ANGELES POLICE DEPT., supra note 58, at 8.
65. Id. at 8-11.
66. Id. at 8; Pool, supra note 8.
67. Feldman, supra note 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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an effective curfew on the target neighborhood.73 Keeping peo-
ple off the streets is the stated objective of the sweep. This goal
is accomplished by the magnitude of the police presence and the
use of all available tools to exhibit police power.74 The ability of
the residents of a target community to leave their homes is seri-
ously chilled by the risk, or the perceived risk, of harassment,
detention, and even arrest for traffic or other minor violations.
This is particularly true for minority and juvenile residents be-
cause the use of race- and age-based profiles to support the es-
tablishment of reasonable suspicion puts them at heightened
risk of police detention.7 5
The rights implicated by such a de facto curfew are the
rights of assembly and free association, and the right of locomo-
tion or intrastate travel.76 The constitutional sources and the
scope of these rights will be discussed in this section. In addi-
tion, cases involving challenges to curfews and other travel re-
strictions will by considered by analogy.77 The cases patch
together a hodgepodge of constitutional theories and tests, but
generally fail to articulate a clear standard for review of local
travel restrictions.
A. First Amendment Rights of Assembly and Association
The Supreme Court has noted that freedom of travel is
"closely related to rights of free speech and association."78 Re-
strictions on movement implicate the rights of assembly and as-
sociation by preventing attendance at meetings and activities
that are protected by the Constitution. The right to peaceably
assemble to petition the government is explicitly recognized in
the First Amendment.79 Although the right of association lacks
73. This Comment is not directly concerned with the potential for individual
Fourth Amendment violations created by the atmosphere of the sweep, where of-
ficers may be more inclined to stop and search under the agitated circumstances
created by the large police presence.
74. See Anderson, supra note 7; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
75. Supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 78-113 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 149-91 and accompanying text.
78. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964).
79. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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explicit textual support in the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized it as a necessary corollary of the First
Amendment.80
The rights of assembly and free association are fundamen-
tal rights.8' Together, they protect many types of associational
activities, including political8 2 and economic activities.8 3 These
rights, however, are not absolute and may be subject to regula-
tion under some circumstances.8 4 In addition, the variety of as-
sociational rights are not all equally protected.8 5 Religious or
political exercise of the rights of assembly and association are
accorded greater protection than commercial or economic exer-
cise of these rights.8 6 Unlike some curfew ordinances that ex-
cept local travel to attend political or religious functions, the
effective curfew established by the sweep does not distinguish
among the types of activities that may be prevented.8 7 Thus,
the effect of the sweep must be considered against the greater
protections afforded religious or political activities.
The test applied in direct challenges to regulations infring-
ing on the rights of assembly and association involving highly
protected First Amendment activities is strict scrutiny.88 The
Supreme Court has found that government infringement on the
right of association "may be justified by regulations adopted to
80. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (striking down a city
ordinance prohibiting assembly of three or more persons on a sidewalk acting in an
annoying manner); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (holding that state of
Virginia could not prohibit the activities of the NAACP); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the state could not compel the
NAACP to reveal the names and addresses of its members).
81. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
82. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976).
83. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217, 221-25 (1967).
84. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984)
(finding that the right of association is not absolute).
85. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 950 (3d ed. 1986).
86. Id. at 951. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982) (involving politically motivated boycott) with NLRB v. Retail Store Employ-
ees Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (involving economically motivated boycott).
87. For example, a curfew enacted in the Borough of Middletown, Penn-
sylvania provided an exception from the juvenile travel prohibition if advance no-
tice of intent to exercise First Amendment rights was provided to the municipality.
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1258 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
88. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
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serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms." 9 Thus, the regulation
must both serve a compelling state interest, and do so in the
least restrictive way.
A regulation infringing on First Amendment rights may
also be challenged as overbroad.9° The overbreadth doctrine al-
lows a party to challenge a regulation even though it may not
infringe on a constitutionally protected right as applied to that
particular party.91 The basic test is that a regulation is over-
broad if, in addition to proscribing activities that may be consti-
tutionally proscribed, it also operates to proscribe speech or
conduct that is protected under the First Amendment.92 How-
ever, a state regulation will only be struck down as overbroad if
it is not subject to a narrowing construction 93 and its deterrent
effect on constitutionally protected activity is real and
substantial. 94
Unfortunately, the cases involving challenges to curfews
or other travel restrictions on First Amendment grounds do
not agree on the proper test to apply. In Johnson v. City of
Opelousas,95 the former Fifth Circuit considered a class
action challenge to a juvenile curfew ordinance enacted by
the city.96 The plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as overbroad
because, in addition to the intended proscription of unlawful
juvenile behavior, the ordinance proscribed constitutionally
protected associational activities.97 The court found that
89. Id.
90. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (holding that a law is void on
its face if it "does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [govern-
ment] control, but.., sweeps within its ambit other activities that... constitute
an exercise" of First Amendment rights).
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
94. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973).
95. 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981).
96. Id. at 1067. The ordinance prohibited anyone under the age of seventeen
to "travel, loiter, wander, stroll, or play in or upon or traverse any public streets,
highways, roads, alleys, parks, places of amusements and entertainment, places
and buildings, vacant lots or other unsupervised places" in the city from 11:00 p.m.
until 4:00 a.m. on weekday nights and from 1:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. on weekend
nights. Id. at 1067 n.1.
97. Id. at 1072.
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under the ordinance minors were prohibited from attending
religious or school meetings, organized dances,98 and other
activities.99 The court struck down the ordinance, holding that
it swept within its ambit "innocent activities which are constitu-
tionally protected," and had a real and substantial effect on the
exercise of First Amendment rights.100
Although the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia also applied overbreadth analysis in striking
down a curfew imposed by the City of Eatonton, Georgia, 1°1 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia re-
jected application of the overbreadth doctrine in a similar cur-
few challenge. 0 2 The District of Columbia court found it
inappropriate to employ traditional overbreadth analysis when
the plaintiffs themselves were engaged in protected activity. 0 3
Instead, the court treated the plaintiffs' claim as a direct facial
attack on the curfew ordinance. 1°4 The court's reasoning, how-
ever, was not altogether clear as it seemingly mixed First
Amendment concerns with Fifth Amendment substantive due
process concerns, arriving at a test requiring the ordinance to
be "narrowly focused on the harm at hand, as well as sensitive
to needless intrusions upon the constitutional interests of the
innocent." 0 5
In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,10 6 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania applied
still a different test in considering a curfew ordinance adopted
by the Borough of Middletown, Pennsylvania. The Middletown
98. Note that the Supreme Court recently held that social events, such as or-
ganized dances, do not implicate associational rights under the First Amendment
due to the slight expressive component of such events. City of Dallas v. Stanglin,
490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989). However, this does not upset the court's analysis in
Johnson because the court also considered the impact of the curfew on attendance
of religious meetings that are highly protected associational meetings. Johnson,
658 F.2d at 1072.
99. Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072.
100. Id. at 1074.
101. Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303, 304 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
102. Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1127 (D.D.C. 1989).
103. Id. at 1133. The court described overbreadth as "essentially ajus tertii
device" to be used by those properly charged under a statute to raise the rights of
others whose rights might be chilled. Id.
104. Id. at 1134.
105. Id. at 1135.
106. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
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curfew ordinance contained an exception for minors exercising
their First Amendment rights, as long as they provided advance
notice to the proper government office.107 Relying on cases in-
volving regulation of public demonstrations such as parades 08
and picketing, 10 9 the court held that the curfew was an exercise
of the Borough's "legitimate interest in the reasonable control of
its streets" that outweighed the "slight" restriction imposed on
the exercise of First Amendment rights. 110 The court did not
address the impact of the curfew on the residents' ability to at-
tend protected private associational activities such as religious
services or political meetings.
These cases provide inconsistent guidance for analyzing the
constitutionality of curfews or other local travel restrictions
under the First Amendment. Although every court recognized
the link between such restrictions and the exercise of the First
Amendment rights of assembly and association, the methods of
analysis and the outcomes varied dramatically. However, the
district court's analysis in Bykofsky is flawed in its application
of a low-level, rational basis type of test to a curfew ordinance.
Unlike the regulation of expressive conduct on public prop-
erty,"' a curfew or other travel restriction directly infringes on
the right to participate in protected activities. Thus, some
heightened level of scrutiny is necessary whether the First
Amendment claim is brought as an overbreadth challenge or as
a direct facial attack.
B. The Right of Intrastate Travel
The individual right to walk to the store to buy food or to
the park to meet friends is so basic to our existence that it is
rarely articulated as a right. The courts have awkwardly de-
scribed this right to come and go as the right of locomotion 1 2 or
107. Id. at 1258.
108. Id. (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)).
109. Id. at 1259 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)).
110. Id. at 1258-59. The court went on to note that any restriction on speech
was incidental to the nonspeech purposes furthered by the ordinance, thus justify-
ing such restrictions under the test announced in United States v. O'rien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968). Id. at 1260.
111. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
112. See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258 (1990).
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the right to travel intrastate. 1 3 The difficulty describing such a
fundamental concept may arise from its very simplicity. Unfor-
tunately, attempts to assign a constitutional basis for the right
have been rare, and generally even more awkward than its
description.
An exploration of the doctrinal foundations of the right of
intrastate travel must begin with the recognition that there is
no express provision of such a right in the Constitution. To
evaluate the basis of the right, it is helpful to consider the con-
stitutional underpinnings of a related right, the right of inter-
state travel. With an understanding of the variety of
constitutional sources relied on to support the universally ac-
cepted right of interstate travel, the right of intrastate travel
will be considered.
1. The Right of Interstate Travel
The right of interstate travel has a rich constitutional his-
tory. Unlike the Articles of Confederation, the United States
Constitution does not expressly provide for a right of interstate
travel. 1 4 This right, however, has consistently been found in
the Constitution, although under a wide variety of constitu-
tional doctrines.1 5 Five principal constitutional theories have
113. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1990).
114. The Articles of Confederation provided that:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants
of each to these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice ex-
cepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens
in the several states; and the people of each state shall have free ingress and
egress to and from another state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of
trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restric-
tions as the inhabitants thereof ....
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (emphasis added).
115. In Lutz, the court identified seven different sources cited by the Supreme
Court for the right of interstate travel: the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
conception of national citizenship implicit in the Constitution, the Commerce
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the two Due Process Clauses. Lutz, 899
F.2d at 260-61. This Comment will consider all of these except the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Although most of the right of interstate travel cases have been de-
cided under the Equal Protection Clause, they do not ascribe the right to that
clause. Instead, the Equal Protection Clause provides the framework for evaluat-
ing whether there is a discriminatory infringement of the right of interstate travel.
See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975) (upholding a state durational
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been advanced in support of the right of interstate travel,116 and
different Justices have sometimes advanced different theories
in support of the same result in an individual case. 117 Each of
the theories will be discussed below.
a. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV
The Privileges and Immunities Clause"" provided an early
source of constitutional support for the right of interstate
travel. In Corfield v. Coryell,119 the court observed that
[tihe right of a citizen of one state to pass through or to reside in
any other, for purpose of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits,
or otherwise... may be mentioned as some of the particular privi-
leges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by
the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental. 120
This clause is still invoked by Justice O'Connor as the legiti-
mate source of the "elusive" right of interstate travel.121 Article
IV, Section 2, however, only protects against state discrimina-
tion in favor of its own citizens.122 Thus, if this is the true
source of the right of interstate travel, the right is limited to
cases involving the basic fact pattern of discrimination in favor
of state residents.123
residency requirement under equal protection analysis); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 627-38 (1969) (holding that state statutes denying welfare benefits based
on length of residency violate equal protection clause).
116. Thomas Steel, The Right to Travel and Exclusionary Zoning, 26 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 849, 858-68 (1975); see supra notes 110-15; see infra notes 117-39 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these theories.
117. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
118. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Id.
119. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
120. Id. at 552.
121. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 80-81 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).
123. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 263-64.
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b. The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and
Immunities Clause
Despite its expansive language, the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 124 was quickly con-
strued as a very narrow guarantee against state infringement
on the rights of national citizenship. 125 The rights of national
citizenship are limited to those "which owe their existence to
the Federal government, its National character, its Constitu-
tion, or its laws."126 Although the Court has been extraordina-
rily reluctant to recognize rights of national citizenship, in
Edwards v. California127 Justices Douglas and Jackson sepa-
rately argued that the right of interstate travel is a right of na-
tional citizenship that is protected against state interference by
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 28 This position has not been subsequently em-
braced by any other Justice of the Supreme Court.
c. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause 129 has been invoked as a source of
the right of interstate travel by some Justices since the mid-
1800s. 30 In Edwards v. California,l3' the Court noted that in-
terstate travel has consistently been considered "commerce"
within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. 3 2 Under Com-
merce Clause theory, state regulation that restrains the trans-
portation of persons and property across state borders is
prohibited. 3 3 The right of interstate travel, as protected by the
Commerce Clause, is grounded in the principle that "the peo-
124. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
125. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
126. Id. at 79.
127. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
128. Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 181 (Jackson, J., concurring).
129. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States...." Id.
130. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404, 445 (1935) (Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo, JJ., dissenting); Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868) (concurring opinion); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283 (1849).
131. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
132. Id. at 172.
133. Id. at 173.
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ples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that
in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division."134
d. Inherent in the Federal Union
An early argument that underlay Justice Douglas's concept
of the right of interstate travel as a right of national citizenship
was the notion that the right of interstate travel is so basic to
the existence of a federal union that it is implied in the nation's
very structure. In Crandall v. Nevada,135 the Court explained
that without such a right citizens would be unable to travel to
the seat of government or its offices throughout the country. 136
Thus, the right of interstate travel flows directly from the estab-
lishment of the nation as a federal union.137
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 138 the Court stated that
[t]his court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal
Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length
and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regula-
tions which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.ls9
Although specifically invoking the concepts of liberty and feder-
alism, the Court found "no occasion to ascribe the source of this
right of interstate travel to a particular constitutional provi-
sion."140 Instead, the Court adopted Justice Stewart's notion
that "a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to
be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the constitu-
tion created. " 141
e. Due Process Clauses
Some Justices have considered the right of interstate travel
an individual liberty interest protected by the Due Process
134. Id. at 174 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)).
135. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
136. Id. at 48.
137. Id. at 49. The Court in Crandall stated that since we are all U.S. citi-
zens, we must be able to "pass and repass through every part of it without inter-
ruption...." Id.
138. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
139. Id. at 629.
140. Id. at 630.
141. Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).
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Clauses. 142 In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 143 the Court stated
that the right of interstate travel is an aspect of the individual's
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.1" Similarly, in Kent v. Dulles,'145 the Court grounded the
right of interstate travel in the Fifth Amendment liberty inter-
est.146 However, both cases also involved significant First
Amendment concerns and closely linked the right of interstate
travel to rights of assembly and free association under the First
Amendment. 147 Thus, the Court's invocation of substantive due
process protections in these cases was rejected by the Third Cir-
cuit as precedent establishing such a basis for the right of inter-
state travel in Lutz v. City of York.148
To date, the only unifying aspect of the Supreme Court's
discourse on the right of interstate travel is the recognition that
such a right exists. Although the Supreme Court has consist-
ently found a constitutionally protected right of interstate
travel, the individual Justices have never reached consensus on
the source of that right. It is important to recognize that the
nature and source of the right of interstate travel have signifi-
cant implications for the degree of protection from government
interference that the right will be afforded.
2. The Right of Intrastate Travel
When we go out to the movies, few of us realize that we are
exercising a constitutionally protected right. That right is not
exercised in watching the movie, it is exercised in leaving the
house and walking or driving to the theater. This "right to re-
move from one place to another according to inclination,"149 will
be referred to as the right of intrastate travel.
To understand the scope of the right of intrastate travel its
doctrinal roots, if any, must be exposed. The arguments sup-
porting the right of interstate travel will first be examined to
see if they support the right of intrastate travel. In addition,
142. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
143. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
144. Id. at 505 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958)).
145. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
146. Id. at 125.
147. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 507; Kent, 357 U.S. at 126.
148. 899 F.2d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 1990).
149. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
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the case law provides significant, if somewhat opaque, support
for the existence of the right of intrastate travel as a fundamen-
tal constitutional right.
Five constitutional theories supporting the right of inter-
state travel have been discussed. The first two theories, based
on the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the
Fourteenth Amendment, can be eliminated immediately. Both
relate to state actions that discriminate against non-resi-
dents. 150 Any intrastate travel restriction such as a curfew ap-
plies equally to both residents and non-residents. Any attempt
to distinguish among the two groups would run afoul of the
right of interstate travel.
The Commerce Clause is similarly inapplicable, because a
purely intrastate travel restriction like a curfew is facially neu-
tral with regard to interstate commerce. Unless an intrastate
travel restriction somehow imposed a burden on interstate com-
merce clearly excessive in relation to its local benefits, the Com-
merce Clause can not come into play.15' The fourth theory, that
the right of interstate travel is inherent in the federal union,
has a logical simplicity that is equally applicable to intrastate
travel. However, the lack of a firm textual anchor weakens the
theory and does nothing to guide the Court in developing an
appropriate test.
The final theory supporting the right of interstate travel,
substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, is the only theory that fully supports the right of
intrastate travel. This notoriously vague constitutional theory
provides for heightened scrutiny of regulations that limit the
exercise of "fundamental" constitutional rights. 5 2 To rank as
fundamental, a right must be "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." 53 The Court announced an alternative formulation in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,15M recognizing as fundamental
those rights "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradi-
150. See supra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
151. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
152. See NowAx, supra note 85, at 367.
153. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
154. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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tion."155 The inherent difficulty in applying these illuminating
tests reflects the doctrine's natural law history.156
Fortunately, application of the substantive due process test
to the right of intrastate travel is relatively easy. Unlike many
other rights considered by the Court, such as reproductive
rights or sexual preference, the right of intrastate travel does
not arrive laden with moral judgments. Instead, the right of
intrastate travel is essentially morally neutral.
Liberty, the yardstick established in the Constitution 157
and invoked by the Court in Palko v. Connecticut,'5" embodies
the core value of the right of intrastate travel - the simple free-
dom to go where one wishes whenever one wishes to go. This
includes the right to walk or drive to the store, relax in the
park, or just talk with neighbors on the sidewalk. If these
things are not an exercise of liberty, it is difficult to conceive
what is. Thus, the right of intrastate travel is a fundamental
right protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The concept of the right of intrastate travel is not often di-
rectly addressed in case law. The substance of the right, how-
ever, is assumed in uncountable opinions. For example, every
opinion considering the validity of a police stop begins from the
presumption of the right to be lawfully on the streets or in pub-
lic places. 159 Some courts have also explicitly recognized the
right of intrastate travel, typically invoking the language of
substantive due process, in decisions concerning vagrancy laws,
restrictions on the right to assemble, and curfew ordinances.
In Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha,oc the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down a statute
providing that anyone found habitually loafing, loitering, and/or
155. Id. at 503.
156. See NOwAK, supra note 85, at 367-69.
157. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
vide that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law." U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
158. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
159. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). "It must be recognized that
whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has 'seized' that person." Id. at 16 (emphasis added); Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40 (1968) (applying the test announced in Terry).
160. 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931).
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idling in a public place would be guilty of a misdemeanor. 161
The court viewed the statute as a restraint on the right of intra-
state travel.
Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our
constitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion - to go
where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to
one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of
others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other
citizens. 162
Based on this restraint, the court held that the statute was
overbroad because it "trenche[d] upon the inalienable rights of
the citizen to do what he will and when he will."1
While not calling it such, the Supreme Court similarly rec-
ognized the right of intrastate travel in Papachristou v. Jack-
sonville.164 In striking down a Florida vagrancy ordinance
providing that "common night walkers" and others would be
guilty of a misdemeanor, the Court discussed the virtues of
"'wandering or strolling' from place to place."' 65 The Court con-
cluded that "these activities are historically part of the ameni-
ties of life as we have known them."166
The right of intrastate travel is also closely linked to the
right of free assembly, 16 7 and the Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized the right of intrastate travel in decisions grounded
in that right. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organiza-
tion,168 the Court considered a challenge to an ordinance requir-
ing a permit to conduct a meeting on public property. 169 The
discussion illustrates the close ties between the right of intra-
state travel and the rights of assembly and association:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
161. Id.
162. Id. at 172 (quoting Pinkerton v. Verberg, 44 N.W. 579, 582 (Mich. 1889)).
163. Id. at 173.
164. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
165. Id. at 164.
166. Id.
167. "The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech
and free press and is equally fundamental." De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937).
168. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
169. Id. at 501.
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of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been
a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citi-
zens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks for communication of views on national ques-
tions may be regulated in the interest of all... but it must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.170
This language highlights that the right of intrastate travel is
critical to the exercise of the rights of assembly and
association. 171
Challenges to curfew ordinances provide additional judicial
recognition of the right of intrastate travel. In upholding the
constitutionality of "emergency" curfews, the Supreme Court
has referred to the "freedom to come and to go" as a liberty that
may "in the face of sudden danger, be temporarily limited or
suspended."172 Yet, none of these Supreme Court cases moves
from general recognition of the right of intrastate travel in some
form to the rigorous analysis of its constitutional source critical
to understanding the degree of protection it will be afforded.
The nearest any Supreme Court Justice has come to ascrib-
ing a source to the right of intrastate travel came in an opinion
with no precedential value. 173 In his dissent from the denial of
certiorari in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,174 Justice Mar-
shall forcefully presented his view that the right of intrastate
travel is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 75
He wrote that "[t]he freedom to leave one's house and move
about at will is 'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered lib-
erty,' and hence is protected against state intrusions by the Due
170. Id. at 515 (opinion of Roberts & Jackson, JJ.).
171. Justice Douglas explicitly recognized this link in Stotland v. Penn-
sylvania, 398 U.S. 916, 921 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Considering the con-
stitutionality of a mayoral proclamation forbidding public gatherings in groups of
12 or more, Justice Douglas asked whether the proclamation "transgress[es] one's
constitutional right to freedom of movement which of course is essential to the
exercise of First Amendment rights?" Id.
172. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 231 (1944) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
173. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (denying peti-
tion for certiorari). The denial of a writ of certiorari is accorded no precedential
value. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
174. Bykofsky, 429 U.S. at 964 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. Id.
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."176 As a funda-
mental right, Justice Marshall would evaluate any state regula-
tion that intrudes on this right under "strict scrutiny," striking
any law not "narrowly drawn" to further a "compelling state
interest."'177
Several lower courts have struck down curfew ordinances
based on a fundamental right of intrastate travel, 178 but only
the Third Circuit has rigorously analyzed the underpinnings of
the right.179 In Lutz v. City of York, 8 0 the court concluded that
"no constitutional text other than the Due Process Clauses
could possibly create a right of localized intrastate move-
ment."18' The court then analyzed the right of intrastate travel
under the formulation of substantive due process advanced by
Justice Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D.182 Under this test, the
Due Process Clauses substantively protect unenumerated
rights "'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.'"183 However, protection only
extends to such rights when they are identified and evaluated
"at the most specific level of generality possible."1'4 The Lutz
court applied this test to the right of intrastate travel, which it
described as "the right to travel locally through public spaces
and roadways,"185 and concluded that even under Justice
Scalia's narrow formulation of the substantive due process test,
the right of intrastate travel is a fundamental right protected
by the Due Process Clauses. 186
What emerges from the cases is a right of intrastate travel
that has neither clear textual support in the Constitution nor a
176. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
177. Id. at 965 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973)).
178. See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct.
1981); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989); McCollester v. City of
Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1984).
179. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 267.
182. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Although explicitly declining to adopt Justice
Scalia's formulation of substantive due process, the court considered it the most
restrictive interpretation currently advanced by a sitting justice and thus the most
difficult to meet. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268.
183. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268 (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122).
184. Id. (citing Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126 n.6).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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basis clearly articulated by the Supreme Court. The argument
advanced by the Third Circuit in Lutz, however, provides pow-
erful support for the existence of the right of intrastate travel.
Of the constitutional bases invoked in support of the right of
interstate travel, only the Due Process Clauses are applicable to
intrastate travel. This is not surprising, because although both
rights involve travel, the nature and effect of potential restric-
tions on intrastate travel are very different from those of re-
strictions on interstate travel.
Although modern substantive due process protections18 7
are quite limited, there is no constitutional or logical basis for
restriction to the specific areas that have been recognized to
date.188 Unenumerated fundamental rights are few, but it is ex-
tremely difficult to argue that those that have been recognized
are the only unenumerated rights "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty,"189 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition. "190
The very concept of liberty rests on the ability to control
one's movement from place to place. It defies conception to
state that an individual unable to walk the streets due to gov-
ernment action has any meaningful liberty.' 9 ' Thus, the right
of intrastate travel should be explicitly recognized as a funda-
mental right grounded in the liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
IV. Seeking a Remedy
Day-to-day police operations and even heightened police
presence to address the possibility of unrest do not necessarily
raise any implications for the rights of assembly or association,
187. As distinguished from the substantive due process decisions of the Loch-
ner-era. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
188. The Supreme Court has recognized six unenumerated fundamental
rights. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITIUTIONAL
LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.7, at 434-35 (2d ed. 1992). These six funda-
mental rights are: 1) Freedom of association; 2) The right to vote and participate
in the electoral process; 3) The right of interstate travel; 4) The right to fairness in
criminal proceedings; 5) The right to fairness in proceedings involving government
deprivation of life, liberty, or property; and 6) The right to privacy. Id. at 435-36.
189. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
190. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
191. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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or the right of intrastate travel. Police activity is a part of daily
life, and most citizens are comforted by the knowledge of a po-
lice presence in the community. To the extent such police pres-
ence generates a sense of security in the community, it may
even promote the exercise of these rights. However, at some
point the magnitude and nature of a large-scale police operation
undoubtedly has the effect of keeping people off the streets.
The notion that a massive paramilitary police operation
will prevent people from exercising the right of intrastate travel
would not surprise the LAPD. The stated goal of their gang
sweeps is to "take people off the street."192 Translated into the
language of constitutional theory, sweeps are intended to "chill"
the exercise of the right of intrastate travel. Thus, the sweep is
intended to operate as a curfew, and when implemented on a
sufficient scale it certainly achieves that intent.
That the intent is only to chill gang members' exercise of
this right has no positive constitutional significance for two rea-
sons. First, an individual does not shed his or her constitu-
tional rights by joining a gang any more than by joining any
group. Second, the chilling effect is not confined to gang mem-
bers, but extends to other members of society who fear that they
may be swept up along with those targeted by police. In addi-
tion, the intentional application to gang members may raise its
own questions regarding potential infringement on associa-
tional rights under the First Amendment. Regardless of the in-
tent of the police, however, the curfew effect of the sweep
implicates both the First Amendment rights of assembly and
association and the substantive due process right of intrastate
travel.
Although use of the sweep has the effect of a curfew, the
lack of a specific ordinance implementing travel restrictions cre-
ates complications for those seeking relief. In actions alleging
constitutional violations resulting from the operation of a spe-
cific statute or ordinance it is relatively easy to apply the appro-
priate standard to evaluate the constitutionality of the
legislation. 193 Here, however, the legal challenge would be di-
rected at a specific government activity used to enforce a variety
192. Anderson, supra note 7.
193. See NowAK, supra note 85, at 359.
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of unquestionably constitutional criminal statutes. As a result,
there is no specific rule to test against the constitutional stan-
dard. This problem may be addressed by challenging the police
department policy of using sweeps as a law enforcement tactic,
and seeking an injunction against the use of the sweep tactic. 194
The constitutional rights implicated are individual rights.
A challenge to the use of sweeps could conceivably be brought
individually, or as a class action. The doctrine of standing
would require that the individual plaintiff, or the individuals
represented by the class, establish a "distinct and palpable in-
jury" that is "fairly traceable" to the challenged conduct. 195 The
problem of standing, however, may be overcome if necessary by
raising First Amendment claims under the overbreadth
doctrine. 196
A. Standards of Review
The courts that have considered challenges to local travel
restrictions under the First Amendment and the Due Process
Clauses have generally not established consistent standards for
reviewing such regulations. 97 Some of the decisions do not
even effectively distinguish the grounds of the challenge, mix-
ing together the analysis of First Amendment and intrastate
travel claims. 98 If the claims are not distinguished, it is impos-
sible to discern the tests applied to evaluate each claim.
As fundamental rights, the First Amendment claims raised
in a challenge to the use of sweeps should be subjected to strict
scrutiny. 199 The sweep, like a curfew, directly infringes on the
residents' ability to exercise their rights of assembly and associ-
ation. The district court's application of what is essentially a
rational basis review in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown200
194. See Spring Garden United Neighbors, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 614 F.
Supp. 1350 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (granting an injunction against police "sweeps" involv-
ing unconstitutional detentions and arrests following the murder of a police
officer).
195. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72
(1978).
196. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); see supra note 96.
197. See supra notes 78-191 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
199. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
200. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
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misconstrues the nature of the claim and is not sufficiently pro-
tective of the fundamental rights of assembly and association.
The issue is not the regulation of expressive conduct, which is
accorded a lower level of protection,201 but rather the direct in-
fringement of fundamental First Amendment rights.
Strict scrutiny can be properly applied whether an action is
brought individually or as a class action. Although precise for-
mulation of the test may vary, the basic requirement is that the
challenged regulation (1) serve a compelling state interest, (2)
be unrelated to the suppression of ideas (content-neutral), and
(3) be the least restrictive alternative available that will accom-
plish the state interest.20 2 Lesser scrutiny would be insufficient
to protect the residents' rights under the First Amendment.
Claims based on the right of intrastate travel must be sepa-
rately judged from those based on the First Amendment. The
traditional standard of review for regulations implicating sub-
stantive due process rights is strict scrutiny.203 However, the
only court to explicitly recognize a right of intrastate travel
rooted in the theory of substantive due process rejected the ap-
plication of strict scrutiny.20 4 The Third Circuit instead devel-
oped an intermediate level of scrutiny based on the time, place,
and manner doctrine developed under the First Amendment.205
The court characterized the time, place, and manner doc-
trine as an intermediate level of scrutiny, requiring only that a
content-neutral state regulation be "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest .. . while leaving open ample
alternative channels of communication."206 In addition, under
this test the tailoring requirement does not require the govern-
ment to use the least restrictive means available, as long is the
chosen means are narrowly tailored.20 7 The court reasoned that
201. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
202. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
203. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)).
204. Id. at 269.
205. Id. Under the time, place, and manner doctrine, intermediate level scru-
tiny is used to evaluate content-neutral restrictions that only regulate the time,
place or manner of the expression. Id.
206. Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293-94 (1984)).
207. Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989)).
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if this intermediate scrutiny is sufficient to protect the enumer-
ated right of speech, a similar test is clearly sufficient to protect
the unenumerated right of intrastate travel.208 Thus, the Third
Circuit found that a regulation infringing on the right of intra-
state travel "will be upheld if it is narrowly tailored to meet sig-
nificant [government] objectives."20 9
The difficulty with a broad application of the Third Cir-
cuit's intermediate scrutiny test is the court's analogy to con-
tent-neutral speech restrictions. The analysis was based on a
specific finding that the ordinance in question, a city ordinance
that prohibited "cruising"210 on specific streets, was closely
analogous to a content-neutral restriction on speech in a public
forum.211 This analogy, however, is stretched in other factual
situations such as a juvenile curfew ordinance or the effective
curfew imposed by the use of sweeps. Such ordinances may not
so easily be dismissed as nondiscriminatory, particularly when
applied to specific neighborhoods within a larger metropolitan
area.
A solution to this problem may be drawn from the Supreme
Court's two-tier First Amendment jurisprudence. While con-
tent-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on public
speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny, all content-specific
restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.21 2 A similar two-tier
analysis may be appropriate in travel restriction cases. Thus,
travel restrictions would be subject to strict scrutiny, unless the
government could make a showing that such restrictions on the
time and manner of travel are nondiscriminatory. Nondiscrimi-
natory travel restrictions would be subject to only intermediate
level scrutiny.
B. The Remedy
An additional problem created by the lack of a specific ordi-
nance regarding the sweeps is that of the appropriate remedy.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 270.
210. "Cruising" as used in the ordinance consists of driving repeatedly around
a loop of certain public roads in the city, which the court noted is 'an apparently
popular activity among local youth." Id. at 256.
211. Id. at 270.
212. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983).
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Challenges to travel restrictions such as curfews typically seek
to strike down the ordinance in question. Because there is only
a police policy of using the sweep tactic, and no ordinance or
statute for the court to consider, the action should seek a per-
manent injunction against the use of sweeps. Such an injunc-
tion must be carefully crafted to preserve the ability of the
police to carry on legitimate law enforcement activities, and
should allow even large-scale police maneuvers when supported
by a showing of factual necessity.
First, an injunction must clearly define the prohibited ac-
tivity. There are multiple variables that must be addressed in
such a definition, including the number of officers, the location
and size of the target community, and even the nature of the
deployment of the officers. Although it may be clear that a
sweep targeting a small community and involving one thousand
officers with air and ground support infringes on the right of
intrastate travel, it is difficult to draw the line where lesser op-
erations cease to infringe on that right.
Second, the injunction should provide for exceptions to the
prohibition based on a showing of need. The problems of urban
crime are severe, and in some locations the fear of crime may
itself inhibit the exercise of the right of intrastate travel. To
allow for the need to use large-scale police operations in re-
sponse to unrest or heightened criminal activity, the injunction
should allow the police department to obtain an order allowing
such operations. This type of order should only be granted on a
showing of particularized need supported by factual affidavits.
V. Conclusion
Implemented on a certain scale, the sweep tactic implicates
fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Fifth, and Four-
teenth Amendments of the Constitution. Such sweeps have the
effect of a curfew, preventing residents and visitors from mov-
ing about in the target community. The courts, however, have
not rigorously analyzed similar travel restrictions such as cur-
fews, often failing to clearly distinguish the various rights im-
plicated by the restrictions.
Although many decisions recognize the First Amendment
impacts of travel restrictions, few have separately considered
the substantive due process concerns that such restrictions
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raise. Concern for the protection of the right of intrastate travel
may ultimately reflect not only a basic respect for the rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, but also the broader conceptual
belief that the United States will not operate as a police state.
The right of intrastate travel is so basic to the concept of liberty
that it must be fully protected against encroachment by law en-
forcement activity.
The use of very aggressive police tactics such as the sweep
raises profound concerns regarding the continued vitality of
fundamental constitutional rights. The problems facing Ameri-
can cities create tensions within our society that continually
test the rights guaranteed in the Constitution and the values
underlying those rights. Yet to abandon these values in the face
of difficulty will destroy this republic as certainly as the difficul-
ties of crime and violence themselves.
Jonathan Hangartner*
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